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Abstract 
 
Central banks like the Bank of England or the Bundesbank have highlighted recently that the supply of 
currency is achieved not by means of printing and spending but by means of credit. This clarification raises 
further issues. This article addresses the issue of seigniorage and optimal inflation. 
So far approaches to seigniorage and optimal inflation are still based on the assumption of a currency which 
is printed and spend by a central authority. From this perspective central banks’ inflation targets and optimal 
inflation targets are at odds with those suggested by economic theory. The so-called Friedman-rule, the 
common core of optimal inflation theory, determines optimal inflation via the (opportunity) cost of 
producing currency. This basic approach is amended by “external effects”, e.g. the impact of monetary non-
neutrality or wage rigidities and so on. However, even under consideration of external effects there remains a 
significant gap between actual inflation targets and optimal rates as suggested by theory. 
The supply by means of credit, however, involves “costs of production” which do not appear in Friedman’s 
case: losses from borrower defaults. Incorporating expected losses into economic theory contributes 
significantly in aligning central banks’ optima with economic theory and provides a new theory of 
seigniorage for a credit currency. 
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1 A new theory of seigniorage and optimal inflation 
Central banks’ inflation targets are all strictly positive. The lowest are around 2%. Most central 
banks define a range somewhere between 2% and 8%. Only a few countries have (temporarily) 
departed from this range, aiming at higher rates, like Argentina, Belarus, Malawi, Ukraine in 2016 
(see table 1). 
Some economists, like Phelps (1973) and his followers, have supported “higher” inflation rates on 
the basis of utility based concepts. Krugman (1997) for instance remarks, “one of the dirty little 
secrets of economic analysis is that even though inflation is universally regarded as a terrible 
scourge, efforts to measure its costs come up with embarrassingly small numbers.” Blanchard 
“derives” an optimal 4% target (Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro 2010), and Rogoff even 
proposed up to 6% (Rogoff 2013). 
 
Table 1: Central banks' inflation targets 
Country Mean Target 
Euro Area, Switzerland <2.00% 
Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea,  
Sweden, United Kingdom, USA, West African States 2.00% 
Australia, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Poland, Thailand 2.50% 
Samoa, China 3.00% 
Albania, Armenia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Samoa, Serbia, Phillipines, Russia 4.00% 
Paraguay, Botswana, Brazil, South Africa 4,50% 
Georgia, Kenia, Moldova, Uganda, Uruguay, Turkey 5,00% 
Jamaica, Mozambique, Azerbaijan 5,50% 
Bangladesh, Pakistan 6,00% 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Vietnam, Zambia 7.00% 
Nigeria 7,50% 
Ghana, India 8,00% 
Belarus, Ukraine 12.00% 
Argentina, Malawi 14.20% 
Reference: Bundesbank Data, Siklos 2008 and Central Bank News 2016 
  
More theoretically oriented approaches, however, come up with significantly lower numbers. 
Admittedly, there is no generally accepted approach to determine optimal inflation. But there is a 
common core. In general analyses start from the Friedman-rule and “add” further external effects, 
i.e. the impact of monetary non-neutrality, incomplete taxation, or wage rigidities. The difficulty for 
monetary policy posed by a lower bound of zero on the nominal interest rate has received some 
special attention in the latest publications, which identify a trade-off between the inflation objective 
and macroeconomic stability (see Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland 2004 or Reifschneider and 
Williams 2000). 
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe's and Martin Uribe's contribution to the third volume of the Handbook of 
Monetary Economics (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2011) provides a good overview. They determine 
the cost optimal inflation according to the Friedman rule and then add the different external effects. 
For all of them they derive an optimal inflation close to or below zero. Hence they conclude that 
from a theoretical point of view the gap between the actual inflation targets of central banks and the 
theoretically optimal inflation target cannot be explained even if various external effects are 
considered (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2011, p. 715). 
Table 2: Optimal inflation as suggested by theory 
Assumption Optimal rate of inflation 
Friedman rule -î 
+ distortionary taxes <0% 
+ untaxed income <0% 
+ foreign demand for domestic currency <2% 
+ price stickiness ≤0% 
+ size and Elasticity of Money Demand <0% 
+ zero lower bound <-0,4% 
+ downward nominal rigidities <0,35% 
+ sticky nonquality-adjusted prices =0% 
+ sticky quality-adjusted prices =k% 
Reference: Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2011 
One of the few exceptions is a high foreign demand for domestic currency. The incentive to tax 
foreign holdings of domestic currency explains inflation targets up to 2%, an argument which 
applies to countries whose currencies circulate widely outside of their borders. The United States or 
the Euro area would qualify as such examples. However, these countries are those with the lowest 
inflation targets (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2010, p. 32). In other words, the actual target rates of 
central banks are considerably above the rate suggested by economic theory. 
“The two leading sources of monetary nonneutrality in modern models of the monetary 
transmission mechanism—the demand for money and sluggish price adjustment—
jointly predict optimal inflation targets of at most zero percent per year. Additional 
reasons frequently put forward in explaining the desirability of inflation targets of the 
magnitude observed in the real world—including incomplete taxation, the zero lower 
bound on nominal interest rates, downward rigidity in nominal wages, and a quality bias 
in measured inflation—are shown to deliver optimal rates of inflation insignificantly 
above zero” (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2010, p. 65). 
As a result there is a gap between actual inflation targets as pursued by central banks optimal rate of 
inflation ( − 	
 = π∗ ) and theoretical estimates of optimal inflation targets. This 
gap may be estimated either by the difference between inflation targets and negative real interest 
rates ( − 	
 = î + π
∗ ) or by the difference between inflation targets and zero (π∗ ). 
The difference between target rates and zero are directly observable as stated in table (1). The 
difficulty with real interest rates is their determination. Combining World Bank Data on real interest 
rates with the IMF World Economic Outlook yields the following figure (see Figure 1). 
The average difference is about 4,4 percentage points with respect to zero and about 11(!) 
percentage points with respect to the real interest rate. Hence inflation targets are on average 4,4 or 
11 percentage points above optimal rates as suggested by the Friedman rule for a fiat currency. The 
actual nominal inflation target are quite heterogeneous and range from close but below 2% 
(European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank) to values above 10% (Central Bank of 
Argentina, the Reserve Bank of Malawi or the National Bank of Ukraine). 
As shown above, the perceived gap between targeted inflation rates and theoretical optima exists 
irrespective of how it is calculated. Nominal targets diverge significantly from zero or real interest 
rates. While central bankers are known to apply economic theory and to rely upon it they have 
reaffirmed their inflation targets. Leading central bankers like Weidman or Yellen reaffirmed their 
targets (see Weidmann 2015 and Yellen 2015). Nonetheless central bankers take the theoretical 
results serious. Even though a theoretical estimate of an optimal inflation target is regarded as “a 
rough approximation”, it “likewise seems crucial to making good policy in the next few years” (see 
Bernanke 2004, p. 166). If this is supposed to be consistent central bankers have to adjust their 
target inflation rates or economists would have to adjust their theoretical results. In this essay I 
argue in favour of the latter. I argue that targeted rates can be aligned with theory by reassessing the 
underlying Friedman rule. 
2 The Friedman-rule in a very simple model 
The common core of modern approaches to determine the optimal inflation is the Friedman-rule. In 
earlier works Friedman had argued for a constant rate of currency growth. Friedman argued that 
anticipated inflation is safer to unanticipated inflation (due to the risk of an upward inflationary 
pressure in the latter). A government should make its monetary policy transparent and stick to it. A 
fixed-growth rule would assist the formation of a constant level of prices, which was regarded as a 
worthwhile goal in itself. This view was revised in his essay on the Optimum Quantity of Money. 
Here Friedman challenged the goal of a constant level of prices and embeds the problem in a 
theoretical framework (see Friedman 1969, pp. 47-48). The supply of commodities is optimal if the 
price paid in the market equals the (marginal) cost of production. Friedman's argument is that what 
is true for commodities must be true for the supply of currency.  
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The orientation on cost of production can be justified, as national legal tender fulfils the properties 
of private goods. Currency is rivalrous, i.e. ownership of one prevents ownership of another, and it 
is excludable, i.e. owners can exercise their property rights. The government is asked to maintain a 
functioning currency regime, a common unit of account, and the currency's purchasing ability, but 
there is no reason why a currency units' price should deviate from its cost of production. With 
respect to optimal seigniorage and optimal inflation Friedman concluded – in a long tradition – that 
seigniorage is optimal if it is cost-covering. A view Friedman retained in later publications (see 
Issing 2011, p. 258). 
For a commodity currency this approach is straight forward. The purchasing power of the issued 
coins must be equal to the price of the contained currency-commodity, e.g. gold, plus charging the 
additional cost for minting. The government must offer to coin gold deliveries freely, charging a fee 
for minting. The difference between the cost of production of a coin and those of the gold contained 
in it would then, in the end, be determined solely by the cost of minting. Fiscal seigniorage 
accordingly is zero. For negligible costs of “minting” there should be no difference between the cost 
for buying and selling the currency-commodity. 
Friedman assumes a fiat currency. For him this means a paper based currency supplied by discrete 
choices on the part of government. The government uses the printing press to finance its spending. 
He assumes that the costs of production of such fiat currency units are negligible. The price of the 
currency should by the same logic be zero. If this were interpreted in the way it is interpreted for a 
commodity currency the government would have to offer to print currency from paper deliveries 
until the value of the currency approaches zero; a questionable proposal. 
For negligible cost of production, purchasing power cannot be adapted to the former. Friedman 
suggests interpreting the money rate of interest () as the currency's “price”, drawing a line from 
the opportunity cost to the price. Consequently he demanded a nominal interest rate of zero. 
“Our final rule for the optimum quantity of money is that it will be attained by a rate of 
price deflation that makes the nominal rate of interest equal to zero” (Friedman 1969, p. 
34). 
The argument which can be constructed is the following: If the cost of production of a commodity 
is zero, then its price should be zero. A price of zero should correspond to a rental price of zero. If 
the price is zero why should anyone pay for renting the commodity (Friedman explicitly compares 
money to other goods in his essay). Even though the purchasing power of money is not zero he 
demands that the supply of currency be adapted to its demand, such that the money rate of interest 
for a fiat currency is zero.2 This rate is then judged as the optimal rate of interest (∗)3. The optimal 
                                            
2   I must say that I find this logic far from convincing. While I agree that cost of production determine prices in the 
long run, it makes no sense to draw conclusions from cost of production which are in absolute contrast to prices. A 
positive price has to correspond to a positive rental price. It is furthermore shown that a more straight forward 
rate of inflation (π∗) follows directly. For a zero interest rate it must – according to the simple 
Fisher equation – be equal to the negative “real” interest rate (î): 
∗ = 0 = π∗ + î  
or   π∗ =	−î 
(1)  
This is the so called Friedman rule. It is usually not translated into a currency growth rule in the 
literature. Yet there is no difficulty in doing so. According to the quantity equation, currency growth 
equals the change in liquidity demand	(g), plus inflation, plus the growth in trade	g. If inflation 
is equal to the negative real interest rate one obtains: 
g∗ = −î +  +  (2)  
Using the Cambridge Equation, there is a simple way to reformulate this result. The Cambridge 
Equation states that the rate of economic growth (g) (which is therefore assumed to be identical to 
the growth in trade g4 equals the real rate of interest (î) times the rate of savings out of profits 
() for constant capacity utilization (g). For a saving rate from profits of one (s = 1) and 
constant capacity utilization (g = 0) the growth rate equals the real rate of interest, the so-called 
golden rule:5 
î = 	#$%	 = 1	&'(	 = 0. (3)  
If the real rate of interest corresponds to the rate of economic growth (g) then the optimal currency 
growth rate is, as suggested by Friedman, given by changes in liquidity preference: 
g∗ = , 
where   π∗ =	−î = −. 
(4)  
Thus the optimal real currency growth is zero except for changes in liquidity demand; thus for 
changes in the currency demand function. Whenever the demand for currency rises it pushes the 
interest rate up, and hence the government is supposed to issue more currency to reduce the nominal 
                                                                                                                                                 
interpretation can be given. If cost of production are positive (no matter how insignificant) a direct cost equal price 
logic can be applied (see Reich 2017). 
3   “B” refers to the underlying legal tender currency or base money and the letter “F” refers to assumed supply 
mechanism of a fiat currency. 
4   In many presentations it is assumed that the volume of trade is linear with respect to the national income (see 
Gebauer 2004, pp. 154-155 or Issing 2011, pp. 31-32). Replacing the quantity of transactions with National Income 
is rather problematic. The quantity of transactions might be different from the national income, and national income 
is usually a weighted measure, thus a price weighted index, of the total volume of transactions. Transforming the 
vector q into a scalar is highly problematic since it assumes the neutrality of money. It should therefore always be 
kept in mind that in fact it is the volume of transactions that is meant, and that National Income is only a rough 
approximation. 
5   Instead of assuming constant capacity utilization, a variant of the Cambridge Equation could be used, where the 
growth rate equals the real rate of interest times the rate of savings from profits plus the change in capacity 
utilization. It states that growth is determined by the retained earnings from profits plus changes in capacity 
utilization. If the golden rule does not apply, hence if capacity utilization changes (i.e. gu≠0), for example because a 
monetary expansion induces growth by a rise in capacity utilization, Friedman's result will not hold. A growth in 
currency supply which induces non-inflationary economic growth by rising capacity utilization leaves the real rate 
of interest unaffected. Consequently, the optimal currency growth rate is higher for economies below full 
employment. 
rate of interest. For a stable currency demand function the currency growth rate should be zero. 
The optimal rate of inflation is the negative real interest rate or – following the Cambridge equation 
– the negative growth rate of the economy. 
A simple model suffices to illustrate the practical implications of the Friedman rule. Following the 
standard approach it is assumed that the demand for currency BD can be expressed as: 
+, = -
.(π)/	0. (5)  
The demand for currency is often determined by empirically estimated demand functions. 
Theoretically the demand depends according to the quantity equation on liquidity demand (-.) 
times the level of transactions, output or income (/Y).6 In real terms, the demand for real 
currency, i.e. divided by prices, one gets: 
/12+, = -
.(π)	0. (1)  
The supply of currency (BS ) is determined by the supply of fiat currency (+3). The supply of fiat 
currency depends on the discrete choice of the central government, as the government chooses to 
print and spend a certain amount of currency (+4). The real currency supply hence depends on the 
amount of government purchases financed by means of the printing press (/546). In real terms the 
supply of currency (+7=/12+) is given as: 
+7 3 = +7
3 = +7
4 = 54
6
. (2)  
If the central government follows the Friedman rule it needs to adapt its currency supply to the 
demand for currency such that the rate of inflation is equal to the negative real interest rate, or if 
that is equivalent equal to then negative growth rate of the economy. As a side note, the revenue 
from seigniorage can be positive even though the optimal level of inflation might be negative (see 
Reich 2017). 
+7
3∗ = 54
6∗ = -
.(π∗)0. (3)  
The amount of real resources finance by means of the printing press is optimal if it is in proportion 
to the gross domestic product, such that the corresponding rate of inflation is equal to the negative 
growth rate of the gross domestic product. 
The following figure (2) pictures a currency supply of this sort which adapts to currency demand. If 
currency demand changes (dotted curve) the supply has to be adapted (dotted curve), such that the 
interest rate does not rise permanently. 
The conflict between theory and central banks’ practice which was shown to exist in the first section 
is due to this analysis. It is the peculiar perspective introduced by Friedman and the Friedman-rule 
which builds the theoretical basis for this perception. 
                                            
6   Referring to real currency demand is tricky. /12 is usually referred to as the level of prices. That means it is the 
price of currency 8 in terms of the vector of all prices p, or inversely, the level of prices in terms of currency. 
Except for a one good world, the level of prices is therefore a vector of prices or a certain aggregated index. 
There are different ways to resolve this perceived gap. One way is to stick to the Friedman rule and 
to justify central banks' actual inflation targets is by assuming higher costs of production. The 
higher these cost the lower the perceived gap. And indeed, central bankers have stressed the costs of 
supplying and maintaining the currency: “resource costs, associated functions, competitiveness, 
inventory costs, volume of regular (liquidity) traders, extent of exposure to informed insiders and 
risk of being caught by an unobservable shift in underlying value” (Goodhart 1989, p. 10). 
 
Figure 2: Optimal fiat currency supply 
 
Illustration based on this research 
 
There is however a second argument which has so far not been developed which shall be put 
forward here. Friedman assumes a fiat currency which is issued by printing and spending on behalf 
of a central government. Hence he assumes that the currency is printed and distributed by the 
famous parable of a helicopter. Leading central banks have however stressed more recently that the 
supply of currency is not organized in such a way by the treasury. Instead the Bank of England 
(2014) or Bundesbank (2017) have stressed that that modern currency supply is organized by 
crediting private banks’ accounts held at the central bank. This endogenous theory of a credit 
currency which is for a considerable amount of time applied in several macroeconomic models is 
still not applied if it comes to seigniorage and the theory of optimal inflation. This is a path chosen 
in this essay. Friedman’s approach is amended not regarding the assumptions on the unit cost of 
producing paper currency or coin. Instead his approach is applied to a currency which is issued by 
means of credit by a central bank. It will be shown in the next section that taking the actual currency 
supply mechanism into account changes the optimal inflation as suggested by economic theory in a 
way which renders the theoretical result much closer to economic reality. 
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3 Optimal inflation and modern central banking 
In a credit currency framework the responsible authority, usually a public central bank, determines 
interest rates at which the currency can be borrowed, and maintains these rates by accommodating 
the corresponding demand. An increasing number of economists have put forward analyses 
assuming a refinancing central bank. There are early contributors, like Wicksell (1898 or 1922), 
Keynes in his Treatise (1930 [1971]), Hahn (1930), Hawtrey (1962), Davidson (1972), Black 
(1987), or Moore (1991). Recently many more contributions around this topic have been made. A 
(not always homogeneous) shift in assumptions, or simply the assumption of a credit currency can 
be found in the work of New Keynesians (Woodford 2003), Post-Keynesians (Arestis and Sawyer 
2008, Lavoie and Godley 2012), other economists (see Binswanger 2013, Gebauer 2004, Nautz 
2000), and Central Banks (Bank of Canada 2010, Bundesbank 2010, European Central Bank 2011, 
Bank of England 2014, and Bundesbank 2017). Surprisingly, these authors either omit the issue of 
seigniorage and so provide no analysis of it, or revert to the standard assumption of a fiat currency. 
Hence, regarding optimal seigniorage and optimal inflation there is no shift in perception. The gap 
between economic theory and central bank policy – it will be argued – is due to the fact that this 
theoretical shift has not yet been completely digested by economists. 
This is surprising in so far as empirical research of the money supply and its revenue already 
suggested that the actual monetary system has progressed to a credit currency regime. The most 
valuable empirical contribution to the changed institutional framework was provided during the 
introductory phase of the Euro. A small group of German authors resurrected the issue of 
seigniorage in connection with the creation of the European Monetary Union (see Gros 1989, 1990, 
1996, 1998, Klopfleisch 2000, Lange 1995, p. 25, Neumann 1992 and 1996, Rosl 2002, pp. 37-42, 
Sinn and Feist 2000, Wesche and Weidmann 1995, p. 27). Trying to estimate the gains and losses 
from seigniorage for the individual national states these authors note that the traditional approach of 
a fiat currency is inappropriate to the modern institutional framework. Instead of dropping the 
assumption of a fiat currency right away they assume that seigniorage is earned as a mix of the 
revenue from printing and spending currency and in form of printing and spending it on private 
interest bearing assets by a central bank, thus interest payments to the central bank. The institutional 
perspective and the issue of the optimal rate of inflation is of minor interest to the pursued empirical 
estimations by the above authors. As these authors therefore do not question the institutional 
framework the approach was initially labelled extended monetary seigniorage (Neumann 1992) and 
later total seigniorage (Neumann 1996, p. 107). From an institutional perspective, the recognition of 
the seigniorage revenue from interest payments to the central bank is however the first important 
step into the direction of acknowledging an institutional change. 
In a credit currency regime seigniorage stems from interest payments made by those demanding 
credit currency from the monetary authority. The monetary authorities supplying the currency 
receive the monetary seigniorage and, after allowing for certain costs, transfer the net revenue, the 
fiscal seigniorage, to the government (the treasury). 
For a credit currency, the supply of currency depends on the interest rates which the central bank 
both wishes to sustain, and is able to. Usually a central bank distinguishes a main () and a 
marginal refinancing rate (i1) and a deposit facility (i;) for balances beyond the minimum 
reserves.  
The marginal refinancing rate is usually a mark-up on the main refinancing rate. At this rate central 
banks provide in principle unlimited amounts of currency (against security). For simplicity, the 
main and marginal refinancing rate may be referred to as “the central bank rate”. Positive balances 
on central banks’ accounts are usually paid a deposit rate close to the main refinancing rate for 
balances due to minimum reserve requirements. The central bank deposit rate constitutes the lower 
and the central bank lending rate the upper bound of the currency or money rate of interest (). 
Depending on central bank policy and alternative currency supplies, the currency rate of interest 
may vary between these rates. If there is no alternative currency supply the currency rate of interest 
will be close to the central bank's main refinancing rate. Hence, by controlling the central bank rate 
and the deposit rate the central bank may more or less precisely determine the currency rate of 
interest. Put the other way around and slightly simplified, the supply of credit currency follows 
endogenously from the currency rate target pursued by the central bank (Bundesbank 2017). 
With respect to seigniorage and optimal inflation the main difference between a printing-and-
spending fiat currency on the one hand and a lending-against-interest credit currency is the risk of 
default. Lending the currency and demanding interest for this loan involves the risk that the 
borrower defaults during this time. The difference is obvious with respect to seigniorage. For a fiat 
currency the seigniorage is completely and finally realized in the moment of issuance. Paying by 
means of printing and spending makes the government realize the seigniorage revenue completely 
in the moment of issuance. Lending a credit currency means to realize seigniorage partially, i.e. 
over time as interest payments while lending the whole amount. Hence, while the seigniorage 
revenue from fiat currency cannot be negative this is possible for a credit currency (see Reich 
2017). 
In other words, what is usually overlooked is that the supply of credit currency involves a default 
risk, the risk of bankruptcy. In another context Stiglitz and Greenwald highlight that the probability 
of bankruptcy is an often omitted variable. Reflecting on macroeconomics as taught before the 
publication of their book they note: 
“There was a single, crucial variable that was omitted from the analysis: the probability of 
bankruptcy, the variable which we have argued, is at the center of all monetary analysis. If 
everyone always repaid their loans, then there would be little role for financial institutions. 
Credit would be a trivial matter. It was understandable, perhaps, for economists who had been 
trained in macro-economics a quarter of a century ago to have failed to pay attention to that 
variable. Even today, the term 'bankruptcy' does not appear in the indices of most macro-
economics textbooks. Yet, for policy makers the mistake is unforgivable” (Stiglitz and 
Greenwald 2003, p. 265). 
This applies also to the theory of seigniorage (see Reich 2017) and optimal inflation as will be 
shown. 
The lending operations of every bank are connected to risks, in particular default risk. That is the 
risk that a borrower goes bankrupt. Whatever the quality of the securities, every private bank 
demands interest, partly to cover the risks incurred, and partly to cover other costs. The same is true 
for central banks and central bank rates. Central banks face the risk that their debtors will default, 
and hence they may be confronted with losses from their credit currency supply (Φ=). Indeed, 
central banks demand good security. However, only the loss given default, not the risk of default, 
can be reduced by the central bank demanding good security prior to issuing currency. As a result, 
the risk of default and the loss given default, that is expected losses, have to be taken into account in 
the calculation of optimal seigniorage and optimal inflation. 
Friedman argued that the price of currency should match its cost of production and furthermore he 
assumed that the costs of production of units of currency are negligible. Hence the Friedman rule 
cannot be transferred to a credit currency straight forward but needs to be reinterpreted. One may, 
for reasons of comparison, keep the assumption of negligible costs of production of the actual 
currency. However, due to the default risk the cost of production are not zero. Otherwise one misses 
an important category of costs arising for a credit currency: credit risk and the losses from a default, 
i.e. expected losses.7 
If the expected loss on a unit of currency is constant over all issued currency units, then the first 
derivative of the “risk function”, i.e. marginal risk, is a constant: 
>?@
A(A)
BA
= Φ=
9(+=) = CA. 
(4)  
This assumes that expected losses do not depend on the size of the stock of issued currency. In a 
simplified example, where the central bank lends a certain sum to the public with an expected loss 
of 1 % per unit of currency per annum of credit granted, then the central bank would be required to 
demand a central bank rate of at least 1 %. If the central bank demands a lower rate it will, on 
average, run a deficit which the government has to cover by other means (for instance, through 
additional taxes). 
The optimal seigniorage has to be such that it permits the cost of production, maintenance cost, and 
                                            
7   Expected losses are the product of the probability of default and the loss given default. 
expected losses to be covered. The same applies to the optimal bank rate, and hence the established 
currency rate of interest. As a result, equation (1) becomes: 
=∗ = CA (5)  
Following the simple Fisher equation the optimal rate of inflation hence becomes: 
CA = π
=∗ + î 
or   π=∗ = CA − î. 
(6)  
As a result, Friedman's claim of a zero interest rate does not apply for a credit currency, even if cost 
of production and maintenance costs are neglected. The central bank rate charged has to cover 
expected losses. The cost-optimal seigniorage rule has therefore to be adapted for a credit currency 
even if other costs are – as suggested by Friedman – neglected. For the credit currency optimality 
requires a central bank rate (=∗) to exceed the optimal rate for a fiat currency as suggested by the 
Friedman rule (∗) by a markup to cover expected losses: 
=∗ = ∗ + CA. (7)  
Similarly the optimal rate of inflation for a credit currency exceeds the optimal inflation for a fiat 
currency regime by the allowance for expected losses. 
π=∗ = π∗ + CA . (8)  
Hence, even if all other costs are neglected a positive central bank rate target can be required for a 
credit currency if expected losses are positive. Depending on expected losses and the real interest 
rate, a positive inflation target can be justified according to equation (10) if expected losses exceed 
the real interest rate or according the Cambridge equation the growth rate. In general it may be said 
that, with a credit currency, the targeted rate of inflation and the currency rate of interest have to be 
higher than in a fiat currency in order to cover expected losses from the supply of credit currency. 
The simple model for a fiat currency of section (2) can easily be adapted to a credit currency. 
Currency demand is assumed to remain the same, as given in equation (5). The supply of currency 
is however not exogenously determined by the discrete choice of the government but by the actual 
demand at a given currency rate of interest. The supply is therefore expressed as a function 
depending on the interest rate. 
The central bank determines its targeted currency rate of interest and supplies the currency 
necessary to defend this rate. Assuming that it is capable of achieving this rate the currency rate of 
interest enters directly into the supply function. 
In the simplest case the supply function is a horizontal, depending on the currency rate of interest: 
+3 = +=
3(). (9)  
In a slightly more complex version the deposit and marginal lending facility can be added, still 
assuming that the central bank’s main refinancing rate is equal to currency rate of interest. This 
yields a “z” shaped supply curve. 
+3 = +=
3
DE;, 
, 
DE1 (10) 
If the central bank aims at the optimal rate of inflation as determined in section (3) it sets the main, 
deposit and marginal lending rates such that the currency rate of interest is equal to the percentage 
of expected losses as stated in equation (11) and such that the rate of inflation is equal to the 
difference between expected losses and the real interest rate. This applies in both cases, the very 
simple (13) and the simple supply function (14). The optimal supply is therefore: 
+3∗ = +=
3∗(=∗) = -
.(π=∗)	F. (11) 
The following figure (3) pictures an endogenous credit currency supply. The dotted line shows a 
change in the supply due to a rise in expected losses per unit of currency. 
 
Figure 3: Optimal credit currency supply 
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unit of currency lent. Depending on estimates of these losses the optimal currency rate and the 
optimal inflation rate for a credit currency exceed the rates for a fiat currency. Any judgement on 
central banks’ targets hence crucially depends on the underlying assumptions regarding the currency 
supply. The perceived gap between central banks inflation targets and optimal inflation for a fiat 
currency are due to the fact that currency is supplied by means of credit. Hence the assumption of a 
fiat currency is not applicable and as a result the respective interest and inflation optima for a fiat 
currency do not apply to the supply of credit currency of modern central banks. The perceived gap 
is therefore rather due to an outstanding update on economic assumptions regarding the supply of 
currency. The gap should disappear or decrease substantially if expected losses are taken into 
account. The next section corrects actual inflation targets by a rough estimate of expected losses. 
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4 Loss corrected inflation targets 
The purpose of this section is to correct the perceived difference between actual inflation targets and 
optimal inflation target. To repeat, according to the Friedman rule inflation should be equal to the 
negative real interest rate for a fiat currency or at least be zero if further effects are considered. It 
was shown above that inflation targets are on average 4,4 percentage points above an optimum of 
zero or 7 percentage points above real interest rates. 
Section 1 demonstrated that expected losses are not part of this consideration. And it was shown in 
section 3 that expected losses should be considered for currency which is supplied by means of 
granting credit. The purpose of this section is to provide an estimate of expected losses, to revise 
theoretical optima, and to compare these to central banks’ inflation targets. 
The approach taken here is to estimate expected losses for central banks by the respective countries’ 
government bond risk. Central banks accept national government bonds as security or deal in 
government securities. Hence their operations depend either way on the solvency of their respective 
central government. And therefore the expected loss of a central bank will be estimated by the 
expected loss on respective government bonds. This, it is argued, applies in both cases where 
central banks issue currency by means of buying such securities or by means of granting credit to 
private companies (i.e. banks) against government bonds as security. 
This raises the problem of estimating the expected loss from government bonds. For purposes of 
simplicity the expected losses on government bonds are inferred from the average country rating of 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. Average country ratings are then translated into Basel weights. Ratings 
are classified in groups of different risk weights according to Basel rules. These risk weights here 
are used to roughly estimate expected losses. Countries with an average A+ to A- rating are 
attributed a 20% weight. Against such collateral 20%*8% of equity have to be held. This is 
interpreted such that on average 20%*8% might be lost by holding this asset; hence an expected 
loss of 1,6%. This yields the respective expected loss per unit of currency (φ) lent by a central bank 
(see Table 3). 
This is admittedly a very rough estimate of expected losses. If it is taken into account the former 
results change. Correcting inflation targets yields a considerably lower gap as usually perceived. 
This applies for the zero target as well as for the real interest rate target. 
Inflation targets (π∗ ) are compared first to the zero target and a zero target corrected for expected 
losses. The difference between targets and optima is given by the nominal target itself and the 
difference to the corrected target by the difference between inflation targets ( − 	
 =
π
∗ )and expected losses (Gℎ − 	
 = π∗ − CA). The difference between targets and 
optima with respect to real interest rates is given by the difference between negative real interest 
rates and central bank targets (ΔR − TARGET = î + π∗ ) and for corrected optima by the 
difference between negative real interest rates, inflation targets and expected losses ( − Gℎ −
	
 = î + π
∗ − CA). 
Table 3: Country rating, respective risk weight and loss estimate 
Country Rating Basel risk weight φ(B) 
AAA to AA- 0% 0,00% 
A+ to A- 20% 1,60% 
BBB+ to BBB- 50% 4,00% 
BB+ to B- 100% 8,00% 
below B- 150% 12,00% 
without rating 100% 8,00% 
Reference: http://countryeconomy.com/ratings 
   Taking the risk of government bonds into account changes the result dramatically. On average the 
target rate minus expected losses is negative. Hence, deducting expected losses inflation due not 
ensure a positive return on the supply of currency. The average difference between optima and 
target rates changes from 4,4 percentage points to (on average) minus 1,2 percentage points. 
Individual rates as compared to expected losses are much more heterogeneous. Nominal target rates 
varied between 2% and 14,2%. Correcting for expected losses yields corrected targets between -9% 
and 6,5%. To avoid a netting of positive and negative deviations the average of absolute differences 
can be estimated. In this case the average difference changes from former 4,4 percentage points to 
2,8 percentage points. 
The picture is different if real interest rates are taken as optima. Central bank targets differed on 
average 11,3 percentage points from real interest rates. Taking expected losses into account yields 
corrected optima from which inflation targets differ on average by only 5,7 percentage points. 
Furthermore there is almost no undershooting. The average of absolute differences is 6,3 percentage 
points. That means the average difference is lower due to individually lower differences between 
corrected optima and target rates, not because of a netting between positive and negative deviations 
from optima. 
In other words, taking expected losses into account shrinks the perceived gap between central 
banks’ targeted inflation rates and those rates suggested by economic theory. In comparison to the 
zero target the average difference shrinks to 63%. In comparison to the real interest rate target the 
average difference shrinks to 55,7%.  
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5 Conclusion 
Economists criticize central banks for their inflation targets. In respect to economic theory the 
perused targets are judged as to high. Interpreting high inflation targets with high seigniorage 
income this suggests that central banks support the treasury and the government’s budget. It was 
argued however that the economic theory which is used for this comparison assumes a specific 
currency supply mechanism. It assumes that fiat currency is issued by printing and spending on 
behalf of the treasury. In such a supply mechanism there is no risk. Seigniorage is realized in the 
moment of issuance by acquiring real resources. 
In contrast to this assumption the modern currency supply is largely organized by means of lending 
currency. Currency is lent to private entities, in particular banks. Banks receive the full amount of 
currency, but the central bank does not receive equivalent real resources. Instead it realizes its 
seigniorage over time by means of interest payments. Thus, while the bank may spend the full 
amount borrowed right away the central bank needs to await its receipts from interest payments. In 
the worst case the central bank acquire losses if banks cannot repay their loans. While these loans 
are usually secured by means of government bonds, central banks might still incur losses if a bank 
defaults and if the government defaults on its security. Hence there is a small risk, identified with 
the default risk on government bonds, that a central bank may incur losses from its currency supply. 
If these expected losses are taken into account the optimal, that is cost covering, rate of inflation is 
higher than suggested by Friedman. For a credit currency optimal inflation and a central bank’s 
targeted interest rates exceed the rates as suggested by Friedman by expected losses. It was shown 
that the perceived gap between central bank’s target rates and corrected optima is considerably 
smaller. 
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